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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 940045-CA
Priority No. 2

DEBRA A. HODGES,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

Cf. Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and rules are
contained in the text of this brief or in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

R. Evid. 403
R. Crim. P. 16(a)(5)
Code Ann. § 76-6-202
Code Ann. § 76-6-404
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err when it allowed the jury to

consider testimony concerning threats allegedly made against State
witnesses when such after the fact evidence, even if true, was likely
to prejudice the deliberation process?

While "an admissibility

decision is the sum of several rulings, each of which may be reviewed

under a separate standard[,] . . . the correctness standard is
applied only to the trial court's ultimate conclusion to admit or
exclude the proffered evidence. . . .

To the foregoing extent, then,

the statement in Ramirez that admissibility is always a question of
law is correct".

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah

1993) (construing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)); Scharf
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) ("we accord conclusions
of law no particular deference, but review them for correctness").
2.

Did the trial court err in not excluding the testimony

of a State witness who had not been disclosed to the defense as a
potential witness?

"The trial court's decision that the State was

not required by Rule 16 to give such notice before trial was a legal
conclusion and we therefore review that conclusion for correctness."
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472 (Utah App. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202, and theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, 76-6-412(1)(d), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David
S. Young, presiding.

On November 19, 1993, a jury convicted Debra A.

Hodges of the above charges.

(R 99-100).

On December 20, 1993, the trial court sentenced Ms. Hodges
to an indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison for the burglary conviction.
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Various court ordered

amounts were also imposed.

(R 107).

An accompanying sentence, a six

month term for the misdemeanor conviction, ran concurrently with the
indeterminate sentence.

(R 108).

Other facts, including those procedurally pertinent to the
issue involving the prosecution's surprise witness, Ruth Ann Smith,
are recounted in full below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 14, 1993, the State filed an Information against
Debra Hodges which charged her with burglary and theft and which
based its allegations on the information provided by four witnesses
(Edward Johnson, Teresa Chistensen, Ken White and Gil Arenaz).
(R 7-8).

On June 16, 1993, the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association

("LDA") entered an appearance of counsel and formally requested the
State to provide the defendant with "A list of all the witnesses that
the State intends to call for trial in the above-entitled matter,
their addresses, telephone numbers and criminal records."
(R 17-20).

Ruth Ann Smith was not one of the witnesses listed by the

State.
On July 13, 1993, the State called three witnesses (Edward
Johnson, Teresa Christensen, and Kenneth D. White) during the
preliminary hearing for the case at bar.

(R 3).

Ruth Ann Smith was

not included.
On September 8, 1993, the State wrote defense counsel to
inform him of four additional trial witnesses:

William Connors, Leo

Pacheco, Dr. Mark Davis, and Dr. LeRoy Anderson.

- 3

-

No mention was made

of Ruth Ann Smith.
On the morning of trial, November 18, 1993, the State for
the first time announced its intention of calling Ruth Ann Smith as a
witness, notwithstanding its "acknowledge[ment] that [Ms. Smith's]
name was not furnished to defense counsel prior to coming to trial
today because we didn't have it."

(R 130, 139). However, the trial

court alluded to the claim that Ms. Smith was "referred to by first
name only in the report of June 11th, 1993 by Detective Arenaz in the
second paragraph of the first page . . . "

(R 137, 139-40).

"The court [went on to] find that there was insufficient
information disclosing the identity of Ruth Ann Smith to the defense
in the report as to only her first name and, thus, the State's motion
to include Ruth Ann Smith as a potential witness in this case is
denied and she will not be allowed to testify."

(R 143).

Irrelevant

to the court was the State's argument that, one, Ms. Smith had only
"called Detective Arenaz this morning [November 18]", and two, other
State witnesses were unavailable at the time of trial.

(R 136, 140,

143) .
After the State presented its case-in-chief, the court
reversed its own pretrial ruling and allowed Ruth Smith to testify.
(R 227).

Ms. Smith's testimony, however, revealed contradiction's in

the State's claim that it had "just [been] informed during the break
after the selection of the jury and before the court began reading
instructions to the jury that a Ruth Ann Smith has come forward and
offered to be a witness."

(R 136).

Contrary to the State's

representations, Ruth Ann Smith's presence at trial resulted from a
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subpoena —

a process which did not occur on its own and one which

began well before jury selection.

(R 256, 261). While the State may

not have known "of her [Smith's] willingness to testify until [the]
morning [of trial,]" (R 240) (emphasis added), the State had
nonetheless issued a subpoena beforehand.

Counsel for Ms. Hodges did

not receive appropriate notice prior to the start of trial.
Trial testimony revealed that during the early morning hours
of June 3, 1993, Edward "Pete" Johnson awoke to find an intruder in
his darkened apartment.

(R 152, 215). At the time of the intrusion,

Johnson was not wearing his prescription glasses. (R 152, 163,
169-70).

The apartment lights were off and the intruder's head was

covered by a nylon stocking.

(R 152, 163, 169-70).

A struggle ensued, during which the intruder apparently said
"something but I [Johnson] couldn't understand it.
Chinese or something."
voice.

(R 165).

(R 164-65).

It sounded like

Johnson did not recognize the

While Johnson managed to remove the stocking, he

conceded that the person may have been someone other than Debra
Hodges (a "white" female resident in the same apartment complex).
(R 151, 167); State's Exhibit 1-S.

The person seen leaving Johnson's

apartment was described as being 5'9" tall.

(R 288).

Debra Hodges

is 5'4"; another resident in the complex, Ruth Ann Smith, is 5'8"
tall and admitted that she was involved.
was taken from Johnson's wallet.

(R 280).

Approximately $20

(R 301).

Ruth Ann Smith testified that there was a stocking, "but
mine came —
off.

I tried to put one on but it didn't stay on.

I didn't have one at the time."

- 5

(R 281).
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It came

Smith attempted to

shift blame for the incident from herself to Ms. Hodges.
Ruth Ann Smith is an addict, an alcoholic who had been
drinking and using drugs (valium, cocaine, alcohol) at the time in
question.

(R 258, 260). Smith claimed that using drugs had not

affected her senses or her ability to perceive the incident.
(R 258).

She also testified that she did not confess earlier

because she "didn't want to go to jail."

(R 257, 262). At trial,

though, Smith claimed that her fear of jail was now outweighed by
her "[guilt for] what happened."

(R 257, 259, 262). Smith also has

another charge pending for a different offense and has been booked
into jail on three separate occasions.

(R 257, 278).

Two of the State's other witnesses, Kenneth White and
Teresa Christensen, testified about matters which had been
previously deemed inadmissible.

(R 132).

Prior to trial, counsel

for Ms. Hodges sought to prevent the State from "attempt[ing] to
elicit [sic] testimony regarding some phone call made subsequent to
the conduct alleged in the information[.]"

(R 130). "There was no

identification of Ms. Hodges in the phone call . . . " and the
alleged conversation was considered "more prejudicial than
probative."

(R 130).

According to State witnesses, in phone

conversations made after the incident but before trial, Hodges had
threatened them and told them not to testify.

(R 130).

At trial, Kenneth White testified that he had witnessed
part of the incident involving Edward Johnson and the intruder.
(R 174-79).

Mr. White and Mr. Johnson both suffer from
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schizophrenic disorders.
intruder was Debra Hodges.

(R 158-59, 187). Ken White said the
(R 177).

Mr. White also claimed that "about four or five days
afterwards[,]" Hodges called him and threatened him with "You're
dead, you're dead."

(R 180, 186). The State further emphasized the

alleged threatening conduct by calling Teresa Christensen, an
apartment resident who had seen nothing during the time in
question.

(R 201).

However, Ms. Christensen claimed that "a day or two after"
the incident she heard Debra Hodges admit her involvement.

(R 202).

Then, "a week or two" later, Christensen testified that Hodges had
threatened her at a bar.

(R 204).

According to Christensen, "she

[Hodges] had been watching me all night, kind of giving me, you
know, we had looks, and then after all my friends left she came over
to the table and she said that if I were to testify against her she
knew of some man, somebody that would come and I would be dead.
would be killed.

If I testified against her."

(R 204).

Christensen also stated that "she [Hodges] just walked away.
you're dead, and walked away."

I

Says,

(R 204-05).

Based upon the evidence presented, the jury convicted Debra
Hodges of burglary and theft.

(R 310-11).

The alleged threats

apparently influenced the presiding judge as well since at the close
of trial the court denied Ms. Hodges' request for continued release
pending sentencing.

(R 326).

"The court does believe that the

defendant has been very inappropriate in contacting other witnesses.
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. . . Those calls to the other witnesses involved threats to their
lives and I simply cannot tolerate that."

(R 326).

Ms. Hodges then

filed this appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it allowed the State to present
testimony concerning alleged threats made by Ms. Hodges against its
witnesses.

Such allegations have no legal relevance to Ms. Hodges

mental state at the time of the incident and even assuming,
arguendof that such after-the-fact threats were made, the
prejudicial nature of death threats far outweigh any probativeness.
Inflammatory comments tend to confuse the jury or lead them to base
their determinations on circumstances other than the pertinent
evidence.
The trial court also erred when it allowed the State to
call Ruth Ann Smith, a witness used without prior notification to
the defense and a last minute insertion which required changes in
Ms. Hodges' theory of the case.

The court also erroneously denied

Ms. Hodges' request for a continuance (for purposes of uncovering
the true motivations behind Ms. Smith's sudden desire to testify).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED TESTIMONY
REGARDING ALLEGED THREATS MADE AGAINST STATE WITNESSES
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, . . . "
Utah R. Evid. 403 reprinted in State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 983
(Utah 1989).

In Maurer, our supreme court cited with approval the

principles underlying State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276
(1972), an opinion with facts virtually identical to the case at
bar.

Maurer and Marler both involved admissibility decisions

wherein the trial court exceeded the "bounds of the 'reasonable or
permissive range' of discretion."

Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984.

As in Ms. Debra Hodges situation, the defendant in State v.
Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276 (1972), objected to testimony
concerning alleged threats made against State witnesses.
(R 130, 180, 183, 186), with Marlar, 498 P.2d at 1280.

Compare

Dennis

Marlar apparently had telephoned a witness and told him not to
testify.

Over objection from Marlar's counsel, the trial court

allowed the jury to consider the following conversation:
Q. [By the State] Did he [Marlar] ever call you at
2:30 in the morning on one occasion?
A.

[State witness]

Yes, sir.

Q. You remember what the substance of that
conversation was?
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A. Essentially that the manner in which the parties
involved were going to testify and that I responded to
saying that 'that just however they testified would
have to be the way they testified,' and I said that 'I
didn't want him calling my home anymore,' and he said
profanity and then 'I'll put you in the morgue,'
Marlar, 498 P.2d at 1280 (emphasis added).
This conversation, the State argued, was legally relevant
in two respects.

"[F]irst, that the evidence tends to establish the

then-existing state of mind of appellant or his intent in committing
the alleged assault; and second, that the subject matter of the
phone calls and the consequent threatening gesture by the caller
(I'll put you in the morgue") connotes an implied admission of guilt
or consciousness of a weak case."

Marlar, 498 P.2d at 1282.

The

Marlar Court found "neither of these propositions persuasive."

Id.

The crucial issue on relevancy, and hence the
admissibility of threats, is the sufficiency of the
threat as indicative of the requisite state of mind.
The statement "I'll put you in the morgue" (even if
made by appellant) does not, in itself, tend to
establish an intent or state of mind at the time of
the commission of the criminal offense. The
statement, at most, was an opprobrious remark
illustrating the caller's malevolent attitude toward
the witness Higgins at the time the statement was made.
Id. at 1283 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
Furthermore, "[e]ven if we could glean some probative value
from the telephone conversation evidence [e.g. implied admission of
guilt], it would be so slight that its admittance into evidence
would not be justified in light of the possible prejudice to
appellant."

Id.

"[B]ecause of the inflammatory effect which the
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threat might have on the jury, it should not have been admitted.
[Since] such inflammatory evidence . . . 'serves only to inflame the
minds and passions of the jury to the prejudice of the defendant' it
is well settled that its admission is reversible error."
498 P.2d at 1283 (citations omitted).

Marlar,

"The fact that there may have

been adequate independent evidence to convict the accused apart from
the inflammatory evidence provides no salvation to the
prosecution."

Id.

During Ms. Hodges' trial, the court allowed even greater
prejudicial evidence to mislead the jury.

Over objection from

defense counsel, (R 183-84), the court allowed Teresa Christensen to
testify about a threat allegedly made by Hodges at a bar.

(R 204).

According to Christensen, "she [Hodges] had been watching me all
night, kind of giving me, you know, we had looks, and then after all
my friends left she came over to the table and she said that if I
were to testify against her she knew of some man, somebody that
would come and I would be dead.
against her."

(R 204).

just walked away.

I would be killed.

If I testified

Christensen also claimed that "she [Hodges]

Says, you're dead, and walked away."

(R 204-05).
Another State witness, Kenneth White, made similar
allegations over objections from Ms. Hodges' counsel.

(R 183-84).

White told the jury that "about four or five days [after the June 3
incident,]" Hodges called him and threatened him with "You're dead,
you're dead."

(R 180, 186).
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The trial court, however, erroneously linked the
allegations concerning Ms. Hodges' "after-the-fact" conduct with
evidence bearing upon the "then-existing" mental state:
if the defendant makes threatening phone calls in
relation to one of the witnesses that's testifying in
this case, that is in relation to this offense. What
I'm thinking of in your [Ms. Hodges] motion in limine,
I'm thinking of an unrelated act like, perhaps, a
forgery in some other year or some other kind of act,
but anything that's related to this offense,
threatening phone calls, if she [Hodges] made them,
would go to the facts of this case and would be
measured and judged by the jury as to their weight and
their reliability by the jury determining whether to
believe the witness. That invades exactly the
prerogative that I think is preserved for the jury.
(R 183-84) (emphasis added); accord (R 256).
Contrary to the court's beliefs, what Ms. Hodges did or did
not say does "not in itself tend to establish an intent or state of
mind at the time of the commission of the criminal offense."

State

v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added)
(construing State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276 (1972)).
"The statement, at most was an opprobrious remark illustrating the
caller's malevolent attitude towards the witness Higgins at the time
the statement was made [i.e. after the incident]."

Marlar, 498 P.2d

at 1283 (emphasis added) quoted in Maurer, 770 P.2d at 986.
Threatening phone calls, even if true, have no legal relevance in
regards to the elements of the crime.
Moreover, as recognized in Marlar, "[e]ven if we could
glean some probative value from the telephone conversation evidence,
it would be so slight that its admittance into evidence would not be
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justified in light of the possible prejudice to appellant."
P.2d at 1283.

498

The prejudicial impact of the threats were no better

reflected than through the lower court's own statements.
In ruling that Ms. Hodges could not remain on continued
release pending sentencing, the court concluded, "The court does
believe that the defendant has been very inappropriate in contacting
other witnesses. . . . Those calls to the other witnesses involved
threats to their lives and I simply cannot tolerate that."
(R 326).

The jury's judgment may have been similarly swayed, with a

lack of tolerance or emotional response fueling an "instinct to
punish or otherwise divert the jury from its task to determine the
mental state of defendant at the time of the [incident]."

Maurer,

770 P.2d at 987.
"[B]ecause of the inflammatory effect which the threat
might have on the jury, it should not have been admitted."

State v.

Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1989) (construing Marlar, 498 P.2d
at 1283).

Other evidence independent of the threats cannot save the

conviction.

Marlar, 498 P.2d at 1283.

should be reversed.

Debra Hodges's conviction

Id.; see Maurer, 770 P.2d at 987.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED TESTIMONY FROM A
"SURPRISE" STATE WITNESS NOT PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED TO
THE DEFENSE
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), the supreme
court expressed concern with a prosecution's response to a discovery
request which may "misled-the-defense":

- 13 -

an incomplete response to a specific request not only
deprives the defense of certain evidence, but has the
effect of representing to the defense that the
evidence does not exist. In reliance on this
misleading representation, the defense might abandon
lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.
We agree that the prosecutor's failure to respond
fully to a . . . request may impair the adversary
process in this manner.
Knightf 734 P.2d at 917 (quoting United States v. Baqley, 473 U.S.
667 (1985) (citations omitted)).
In the present case, the record establishes that counsel
for Ms. Hodges had requested the State to provide "A list of all the
witnesses that the State intends to call for trial in the
above-entitled matter, their addresses, telephone numbers and
criminal records."

(R 17-20); cf. Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (such

requests "specifically and unmistakably [seek] disclosure of [Utah
R. Crim. P. 16](a)(5) material consisting of the names and addresses
of witnesses and their statements"); Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(5)
states, "Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose
to the defense upon request the following material or information of
which he has knowledge . . . any other item of evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense").
However, Ruth Ann Smith was never named as a State
witness.

She did not testify at the preliminary hearing and the

State even acknowledged "that [Ms. Smith's] name was not furnished
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to defense counsel prior to trial today because we didn't have it."
(R 130, 139). While Ms. Smith's own testimony revealed that a
subpoena prompted her appearance, (R 261) —

a representation at

odds with the State's claims, her impact on the trial was undeniable.
Without Ms. Smith, the State had little more than a victim
unsure in his identification, (R 151, 167); a neighbor's perception
of the intruder's voice, "shape", and clothes, (R 179); and
inadmissible allegations concerning death threats.
Point I.

See supra

With Ms. Smith, the State now had a focus different from

its pretrial presentation of witnesses, (R 139), its case-in-chief
having changed without notice to suddenly emphasize a claimed
accomplice who allegedly acted as a "lookout" for the burglary.

The

State's "eleventh-hour" witness severely hampered the defense's
ability to prepare and counter such claims.

Cf. Knight, 734 P.2d

at 917 (quoting Baqley# 473 U.S. at 682 (having been misled, "the
defense might abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses,
or trial strategies that it otherwise would have pursued")).
Counsel for Ms. Hodges attempted to mitigate the impact of
the unexpected testimony by requesting a continuance, cf. State v.
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990), but the trial
court denied the request.

(R 246).

Ms. Hodges was left with little

time to investigate Ruth Ann Smith's motivations for testifying, to
uncover legitimate reasons other than her claim that she "can't have
good recovery unless I'm [Smith] honest[,]" (R 258), or her denials
that other prior arrests had affected her willingness to so readily
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incriminate herself in the involved burglary, (R 257-58), or Smith's
uncharacteristic sense of comfort with the prosecution, (R 246-47),
one which a three time arrestee would not be expected to have.
Unlike the situation in State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461
(Utah App. 1993), where this Court held "that the State was not
precluded from calling a rebuttal witness not disclosed before trial
in circumstances where it, in good faith, had no reason to expect
the need for such witness before trial[,]" jLd. at 473 (emphasis
added), the State's use here of a key witness should have been
disclosed formally to Ms. Hodges because it expected or should have
expected the need for her testimony, see State's Exhibit 1-S
(Officer Arenaz's police report), prior to the morning of trial.
The trial court's decision to allow Ms. Smith to testify should be
reversed.

CONCLUSION
Debra Hodges respectfully requests that this Court reverse
her conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

QJ^

day of May, 1994.

RCfN^LD
SAFd:
RONALD SAFUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded u its prooauve vmue i» suw .
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
It may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.'

76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
budding or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felonyTtheft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelhng, in which event it is a felony of the second decree.

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A Derson commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over

